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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
by
David M. Guinn*

T

HE survey period once again produced a large volume of administrative law decisions, and the majority of these dealt with well-established
principles that do not merit reiteration. Those of major significance fall
within the three primary areas discussed in previous Surveys:1 constitutional considerations, administrative adjudication, and the various subheadings under judicial review-statutory interpretation, substantial evidence, jurisdictional facts, and the validity of administrative rules.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSIDERATIONS

One of the few supreme court decisions during the past year to deal
strictly with an administrative law problem concerned the constitutionality of certain revisions to the Texas barber law.'

Texas State Board of Barber Examiners v. Beaumont Barber College,
Inc.' was an appeal from an order of the Board revoking a permit to
operate the college. The original permit was issued on August 28, 1959,
and the law in effect at that time did not specify the square footage
requisite for such an establishment. 4 However, the 1961 amendments to
the Texas barber law specifically required that all barber colleges that
issue "Class-A" permits have a minimum floor space of 2,800 square feet.'
The Beaumont Barber College had only 1,000 square feet.
The college attacked the statute as an unreasonable exercise of the police
power, and the trial court ruled in favor of the Board. However, the
Austin court of civil appeals reversed," holding that the 1961 revisions
were arbitrary, unnecessary, unreasonable, and had no relationship to the
public health or welfare.
On appeal, the supreme court was presented with two principal issues:
(1) whether the law was retroactive in violation of article I, section 16
of the Texas Constitution," and (2) whether the statute was a reasonable
exercise of the police power. A unanimous court concluded that the legislature intended the new provisions to apply to all barber colleges, including
those then in existence. Even though the Beaumont Barber College issued
permits under the old law, it did not thereby obtain a constitutionally* J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., The University of Michigan. Associate Professor of Law,
Baylor University.
1See FitzGerald, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 212 (1969);
Guinn, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 216 (1970).
'TEx.
PEN. CODE ANN. art. 734(a) (1970), amending id. art. 734(a) (1961).
3454 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1970).
4
TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 734(a), S 9 (1929).
6
1d. art.734(a), S 9(c) (1970).
" Beaumont Barber College, Inc. v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 448 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1970).
' TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16, provides: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law,
or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made."
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protected, vested right of immunity from further or different statutory
regulation. The change may have had a retroactive effect, but it was not
unreasonable.
Concerning the question of reasonable utilization of the police power,
the court concluded that it could not declare that the floor space requirement bore no reasonable relationship to the public health, comfort, safety,
or welfare. "There may be differences of opinion concerning the necessity
or desirability of the regulations under review but this does not afford
a sufficient basis for the courts to strike down the legislation as arbitrary
or unreasonable." '
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION

In Johnson v. Texas Board of Chiropractic Examiners' the Amarillo
court of civil appeals recently held that the time in which a chiropractor
had to appeal a license revocation is to be computed from the date the
order of revocation is made public, and not from the date of actual
rendition.
Johnson was charged with violating rule 13 of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Board of Chiropractic Examiners." On March 20,
1969, a hearing was held upon the charges. No decision was announced
by the Board. Instead, on April 7, 1969, the Board mailed to Johnson
its order dated March 20, 1969, suspending his license to practice. This
letter was received by the licensee on April 9, 1969, which was the twentieth day from the date of the order. On April 23, 1969, sixteen days
after the mailing of the order and fourteen days after actual receipt thereof, Johnson perfected his appeal to an appropriate district court.
The trial court sustained the Board's jurisdictional plea predicated upon
article 4512 (b), section 14, which provides that a licensee must perfect
his appeal from a Board ruling "within twenty (20) days after the making
and entering of such order."" However, the appellate court concluded
that the legislature intended the twenty-day period to begin to run on
the date the order was issued, released, or otherwise published or made
public. This occurred when the Board posted a letter and copy of the
decision in the mail on April 7, 1969. The court was careful to make
clear that they were not to be understood as holding that actual notice
had to be received by the licensee. The court concluded: "We . . .hold
that the 20-day period to take an appeal in which the party whose license
to practice chiropractic has been cancelled, revoked or suspended does
),12
not begin to run until the order is made available to that party ....
8454 S.W.2d at 733.
9449 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969).
10 RULES

AND

REGULATIONS

OF

THE TEXAS

BOARD

OF CHIROPRACTIC

EXAMINERS

rule 13

(1957) provides: "Under the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of Section 14a, the Board rules
that it shall be considered unprofessional conduct for a licensee: . . . 13. To advertise fees for
service, 'Free Examination,' 'No Charge for Consultation,' or other like phrases or words."
" TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4512(b), 5 14 (1966).
12 449 S.W.2d at 148.
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III.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

Statutory Interpretation. The survey period produced three interesting
cases involving statutory interpretation. Although this is clearly a question
of law upon which the courts may properly substitute their judgment
for that of the agencies,"a in two of the three decisions the appellate courts,
placing considerable emphasis upon agency analysis,' affirmed the finding
of those agencies.
In Texas Employment Commission v. Kirkland5 the El Paso court of
appeals ruled, in accord with the Texas Employment Commission, that
an individual who limited his offer to work for one week was not "available for work" within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act."
Kirkland, a retired Army enlisted man, registered for work at an employment office and reported to that office each week during the fourteen
weeks for which he claimed benefits. At the time of initial registration,
he advised the Commission that he had applied for on-the-job training
as a dental technician through a program sponsored by the Veterans Administration. He further advised it that his eligibility for that program
would be established quickly, possibly within one to two weeks, and, therefore, his "availability for work" applied only to that period of time. The
Commission denied compensation. However, upon appeal to the appropriate county court, this determination was reversed. The Commission
appealed the reversal, and the court of civil appeals ruled that the claimant's limiting his availability for work to one week effectively detached
him from the labor market."
In a second instance of statutory interpretation, a Houston court of
civil appeals held that under the Fireman's and Policeman's Civil Service
Act, s an applicant would not be eligible for a promotion unless he had at
least two years of continuous, uninterrupted service immediately preceding the promotional exam.'
The Fireman's and Policeman's Civil Service Commission of Houston
"See 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 665-67, 706-22 (1965).
" This is somewhat of a departure from last year's results. See Guinn, Administrative Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 216, 220-21 (1970).
1'445
S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969).
1
"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-2 (1971) provides in part:
An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any
benefit period only if the Commission finds that:
(a) He has registered for work at, and thereafter has continued to report at, an
employment office in accordance with such regulations as the Commission may prescribe;
(b) He has made a claim for benefits in accordance with the provisions of [art.
522lb-3];
(c) He is able to work;
(d) He is available for work ....
" In relation to a second point raised in the case, the court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's ruling that Kirkland had not made a reasonable,
diligent search for work in his locality. See Texas Employment Comm'n v. Holberg, 440 S.W.2d
38 (Tex. 1969), discussed in Guinn, Admiuistrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw.
L.J. 216, 225 n.42 (1970).
8
' Tux. REv. CirV. STAT. ANN.

'City
n.r.e.

art. 1269m (1963).

of Houston v. Landrum, 448 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1970), error ref.
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scheduled a promotional exam for the position of chauffeur in the Houston
fire department. Landrum made application to take the test but was refused by the Commission on the grounds that he had not been employed
by the fire department continually for two years immediately preceding
the date of the exam, as required by article 1269m, section 14." The district court reversed and the Commission appealed.
The applicant's employment record with the fire department was rather
extensive, though sporadic. The record indicated that from August 16,
1949, to October 25, 1968, he had been employed no less than four times.
The last date of reinstatement fell on October 25, 1968, slightly less than
eight months prior to the date set for the examination.
The appellate court, in upholding the Commission's interpretation of
article 1269m, section 14, ruled that a reading of that section indicated
a legislative intent and purpose to promote only those with at least two
years of continuous service immediately preceding a promotional exam.
Further, the court held that the phrase "held a continuous position for
two years" 1 connotes holding a position for such period without interruption.
In the only case in which the court disagreed with the agency interpretation, the Fort Worth court of civil appeals recently concluded that the
Board of Dental Examiners was without statutory authority to enact its
Telephone-Directory-Listings Rules and Regulations. In Texas State Board
of Dental Examiners v. Prichard"a the license of Dr. Prichard was suspended for listing his name in the telephone directory under a separate
limitation of practice, as prohibited by the Board's regulations." The sus2

°TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, §§ 14(A), (D) (1947), provides:
(A) All promotional examinations shall be open to all policemen and firemen who
have held a continuous position for two (2) years or more in the classification immediately below in salary of that classification for which the examination is to be
held;

(D) ..
[n]o person shall be eligible for promotion unless he has served in such
Department for at least two (2) years immediately preceding the day of such promotional examination in the next lower position or other positions specified by the
Commission.
21 Id.
22446 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
' RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE TEXAS STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS rule IV-4
(1961) (emphasis added):
(a) A dental licensee may not have more than two professional listings such as are
usually contained in a telephone book, one in the 'white' and one in the 'yellow'
section, and such listing shall be in regularly used small size type and not be printed
in large or bold face type, or be multi-colored, or set in a border of any kind. Such
listings may contain only the name, the dental degree or degrees conferred on such
licensee, the address and the telephone numbers of the practitioner at such address.
Where a practitioner limits his practice to one specialty he may add, immediately
following his alphabetical listing, such limitation of practice or specialty as provided
in these rules. A practitioner shall not list or permit the listing of his name or address
under any separate limitation of practice or specialty heading or at any address at
which he is not practicing.
(c) It shall be the duty of each dentist who practices or has practiced at any location to advise the telephone company of any change in his status or location
sufficiently in advance to prohibit erroneous or misleading information to be published and to conform with these rules.
In 1967, when the complaint in question was filed, Dr. Prichard was listed in the yellow pages
of the telephone directory under hisspecialty as follows:
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pension was appealed to the district court, where, after a full hearing,
the order of suspension was revoked. The Board appealed, contending
that the order was not shown to be arbitrary, illegal, or void, and was
reasonably supported by substantial evidence. The doctor's sole contention
was that the rules were void because the agency lacked statutory authority
to enact them.
The rule-making power of the Board is governed by two separate statutory provisions. Article 454324 of the civil statutes authorizes the Board
to enact any rule governing its own proceedings and the examination of
applicants. Article 4551 (d) permits the Board to adopt rules to carry
out the provisions of the Dental Practice Act," as long as the regulations
are not inconsistent with that Act.
The court of appeals, after a thorough analysis of the above-mentioned
provisions and all other dental statutes, concluded that revocation of a
license could not be predicated upon acts or conduct not specifically prohibited by statute or clearly embraced within their terms. The court further concluded that the only punishable offenses under the dental statutes
were those which a majority of the legislature had passed upon, and that
the statutes in question did not authorize the Board to promulgate by rule
additional punishable offenses which were unrelated and inconsistent with
the statutes.
According to Professor Davis," when the validity of a legislative rule is
in issue, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its judgment
for that of the agencies as to the content of the rule, for the legislative
body has placed the authority in the agency and not in the court. In reviewing the validity of such a rule, the scope of judicial review is limited
to three issues: (1) whether the rule is within the power granted, (2)
whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (3) whether it is
reasonable." The Pricharddecision is a classic example of an attack upon
the validity of an agency rule predicated upon a lack of statutory authority.
One cannot help wondering about the value of the Prichard case as
precedent, even though the Texas supreme court found no reversible error.
The court of appeals emphasized the distinguished qualifications of Dr.
Prichard"' and the exceedingly harsh remedy of suspension for such a
Dentists-Periodontists (Guin Diseases)
Prichard, John F.
Business Address-phone number
Residence Address-phone number
446 S.W.2d at 907. He had listed his name and specialty exactly the same way since 1947, when
he was certified as a specialist in periodontics. Id.
'TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4543 (1960).
"Id. art. 4551d (1960).
MId. arts. 4543-51f (1960).
271 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03
28

Id.

29Concerning Dr. Prichard's qualifications, the

(1958).

court stated:

Appellee . . . has been licensed . . . to practice dentistry continuously since
1928, the same year he received his D.D.S. degree from Baylor at Dallas. He is a
doctor of dental surgery. His practice is limited to periodontics. He has had numerous
post graduate courses in periodontics at such institutions as Boston University,
Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, Northwestern University, and the University of Michi-
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relatively insignificant violation not involving unprofessional conduct.

To support the Board's promulgation of the rules, it certainly appears that
there is just as much statutory authority under the dental statutes as exists under the Optometry Act,"0 and the Board rules in the latter case
were upheld by the supreme court in Texas State Board of Examiners in
Optometry v. Carp."'
The Substantial Evidence Rule. In May 1970, the supreme court, in applying the Texas substantial evidence rule, reversed a lower court determination to the effect that an order of the Texas Aeronautics Commission was
not reasonably supported by substantial evidence."3 The court of appeals
decision was discussed at length in last year's Survey, and it was suggested
at that time that the court had apparently misconstrued the functions of
the substantial evidence test."
Air Southwest had made an application to the Commission for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to operate a scheduled commuter
service between Dallas-Fort Worth, San Antonio and Houston. Braniff
Airways, Continental Airlines, and Trans-Texas Airways (TTA) intervened and contested the application. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the Board issued an order granting the application. The intervenors
brought suit in the district court, where the order was set aside. The Austin
court of appeals agreed with the district court that the order was not
reasonably supported by substantial evidence. While the court recognized
that the evidence in behalf of the appellant comprised "a substantial part
of this record,"' it did not deem that controlling in light of the fact that
the testimony of several witnesses was "too vague and general to formulate
evidence of a nature substantial enough to cast any doubt whatsoever on
the adequacy of service presented through the testimony of the [intervenors] ."'

Before the supreme court, Braniff, Continental, and TTA contended
that the court need only examine the present services afforded by them to
gan. He is a past-president of the American Society of Periodontics, a Diplomate of
the American Board of Periodontology. The latter was the result of a National Board
examination in 1947, at which time he was certified as a specialist in periodontics.
He is a member of the American Dental Association, the American Academy of Oral
Roentgenology, the State and District Dental Associations, and of numerous other
professional societies.
He is the author of a 600 page published textbook on advanced periodontal disease
which is in general use with practically all graduate courses and a number of undergraduate dental schools.
He is a Senior Consultant of the Periodontics Department of the University of
Washington in Seattle, a visiting lecturer in the Periodontics Department of the University of Pennsylvania. He has been active with and is now Honorary Consultant
to the United States Public Health Service through the Air Force at Lackland, Carswell, and the United States Public Health Hospital in Fort Worth.
446 S.W.2d at 907.
"°Trx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4552-56 (1960).
a1 4 1 2 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1967).
" Texas Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1970).
aGuinn, Administrative Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 216, 226 (1970).
4
" Texas Aeronautics Comm'n v. Braniff Airways, 439 S.W.2d 699, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1969).
5id. at 711.
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these cities and, upon finding those services adequate, conclude the case
in their favor. The court first observed that the statute in question did
not specifically require the Commission to determine that existing services
were inadequate prior to granting a new certificate.' However, the court
noted that whether named or not, adequacy of existing service is always
an important consideration in determining public need for additional
service. This does not mean, however, that adequacy should be taken to
denote bare sufficiency. The existing air service, for example, could be
inadequate even though anyone with a fare is presently able to obtain
passage. The court then concluded that based upon the record they could
not say that a decision either granting or denying the application would
be unsupported by substantial evidence."
The survey period produced the first reported case under the 1967
revisions to the Medical Practice Act,"s which now provides that medical
license revocations are subject to substantial evidence review."'
5 a physician
In Korndorffer v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners"
was charged with having in his possession during a period of time from
November 1, 1966, to December 13, 1967, 1,598 demerol tablets and
872 codeine tablets, and that his records did not disclose the name or
names of the persons to whom these drugs were dispersed. The Board
alleged that the doctor's failure to keep such records constituted a violation
of article 4506." After a hearing before the Board, the doctor's license was
revoked, whereupon he appealed to the district court which upheld the
order of revocation.
Appellant was a licensed physician specializing in pathology. He did
not regularly treat private patients and was not engaged in the private
practice of medicine. He testified that he had administered to himself four
tablets of demerol every four hours for a period of three months. He
further testified that he had dispensed an unspecified amount of demerol
and codeine to his wife and two older children, on the advice of their
respective physicians. Korndorffer also related that he kept no formal rec'

TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 46C-6, subdivision 3 (1969)

provides in part:
As to the economic regulations promulgated, the Commission shall take into account the financial responsibility of the carrier, the public convenience and necessity
for the proposed service, routes, proposed rates or charges, the effect on existing carriers, and any other factors bearing a relation thereto and pertaining to the public
interest and necessity.
" The most pertinent portions of the record considered by the court were: (1) the poor
performance record of existing carriers, (2) the admissibility of a survey of public attitude toward
the proposed system, prepared by Air Southwest, and (3) the proposal itself. 454 S.W.2d at 202-04.
" TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 4495-512 (1970).
3 Id. art. 4506 provides in part: "Any person whose license to practice medicine has been cancelled, revoked or suspended by the Board may, within twenty (20) days after the making and
entering of such order, take an appeal to any of the district courts in the county of his residence
....
The proceeding on appeal shall be under the substantial evidence rule
40448 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1969), error granted.
4
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4506 (1966), as amended, id. § 4506 (1970), provides:
"The Texas State Board of Medical Examiners shall have the right to . . . suspend the license
of any practitioner . . . for any cause for which the Board shall be authorized to refuse to admit
persons to its examination, as provided in Article 4505 .......
".In Korndorffer the Board relied
upon the cause enumerated in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4505, § 4 (1966): "Grossly unprofessional or dishonorable conduct [of] a character which in the opinion of the Board is likely
to deceive or defraud the public."
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ords of the drugs dispensed by him, but he did have records of invoices,
orders, and payments, and, therefore, the number of tablets on hand was
ascertainable. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics testified that
he checked the narcotic records and drugs of the appellant and determined
that there was a shortage of 1,598 tablets of demerol and 872 of codeine.
Further, the shortage occurred sometime between November 1, 1966,
and December 13, 1967. The agent testified that he knew the quantity of
narcotics the appellant ordered, how much the doctor had on hand, and
how much he was supposed to have on hand.
The court of civil appeals, in remanding the case for further clarification of the record, concluded that the only proof against the doctor consisted of hearsay. The amount of narcotic drugs which he had ordered,
which comprised the claimed shortage, was not proved by legal and competent evidence. Further, there was no proof of any kind of the reasonableness and propriety of appellant's dispensing of drugs, whether the quantities administered were to be considered small or large. Medical testimony
was required for a proper determination of this issue. In any event, the
court believed the record to be "incomplete,"" and that even though the
order of the Board was not reasonably supported by substantial evidence,
the record should be more fully developed.
The case is interesting for several reasons. First, without hesitation, the
court approved the amendment to article 4506, and conceded that while
de novo review had been the previous rule in medical revocation, substantial evidence now prevailed.' Secondly, the court appears to be relying
upon something closely akin to the residuum rule" in requiring legally
competent evidence to support the order. Thirdly, the requisite of expert
medical testimony is nothing more than a reiteration of a supreme court
principle established in Scott v. State Board of Medical Examiners.' Finally,
the rather unique disposition of the case is somewhat puzzling. The court
concluded that the order of the Board was not reasonably supported by
substantial evidence, but that the record needed further clarification. If
the order was not supported by substantial evidence, it is uncertain what
the function of the remand might be.'
S.W.2d at 824.
" De novo review of medical license revocations provided for in TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 4506 (1929) was extensively discussed and upheld in the supreme court decision of Scott v.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners. 384 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1964).
" "Under this rule it is said that a finding cannot be supported by substantial evidence unless
at least a residuum of the supporting evidence would be competent under the exclusionary rules.
For example, if the supporting evidence were all hearsay, it could not be deemed substantial." 1
F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTsATIVE LAW 405 (1965). The merits of the same are fully discussed
in 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 14.10-.12 (1958), and in 1 F. COOPER, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 404-12 (1965).
"384 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1964).
4
" The Texas supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part in Korndorffer v. Texas State
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 13 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 474 (1970). In an opinion written by Judge Pope,
the court agreed with the court of appeals that the Board's order of revocation was not supported
by substantial evidence, and that that portion of the court of appeals' decision reversing the trial
court on this point should be affirmed. However, the part of the judgment which remanded the
case to the trial court for further clarification of the record was reversed.
The supreme court specifically pointed out that the charge against the physician was that his
failure to keep records was likely to deceive or defraud the public. See note 41 supra. The Board
4448
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JurisdictionalFacts. In what is probably the most unusual holding to be
reported during the survey period, the Texarkana court of civil appeals
ruled that a litigant is entitled to a jury trial on the jurisdictional issue
of notice in a forced pooling case under article 6008c. "7
T. E. Coleman brought a suit for a permanent injunction against the
Texas Railroad Commission. The action was designed to test the validity
of an order of the Commission pooling all unpooled mineral interests
underlying an eighty-acre proration unit previously formed by the Commission in the Simms Field in Bowie County, Texas.
In March 1955, Coleman leased his one-half undivided interest in the
minerals of a 240-acre tract to one Boyd. In July 1962, Coleman divided
the fee ownership of the land in the leased tract by deeding 182.66 acres
to the Veterans Land Board. In turn, the Board conveyed the land to one
Ashford. An assignee of the lease drilled a producing well on the leased
land. The well site was on the part of the 240-acres leased tract retained
by and belonging to Coleman. An order of the Commission forming an
eighty-acre proration unit made up of 35.25 surface acres belonging to
Coleman and 44.75 acres belonging to Ashford was secured by the well
operator. After purchase, Ashford received delay rentals accruing under
the Coleman-to-Boyd lease. After production, neither rentals nor a portion
of production or its value were paid to Ashford. He petitioned the Railroad Commission to employ article 6008c, s and make an order pooling
his royalty acreage in the production unit with that of Coleman. The
application was granted and a forced pooling order issued approving Ashford's offer to Coleman of a forty-five per cent/fifty-five per cent division
of royalty, with Coleman taking the larger percentage.
Coleman appealed to the district court and contended that the Railroad
Commission did not have jurisdiction because he had never received the
notice required by article 6008c.' He further contended that he should
receive a jury trial on the issue of notice. The trial court considered Coleman's request for a jury, but determined that the case should be tried
under the substantial evidence rule. The court then held that there was
substantial evidence that Coleman had received the required notice, and
upheld the Commission order.
The appellant's two principal contentions on appeal were that the Railrecognized the necessity of proving deceit or fraud upon the public and argued that TEX. PEN.
CoDE ANN. art. 725b, § 9 (1970) required physicians to keep a record of drugs received and
of drugs administered other than by prescription. The above provision excused records in certain
instances, and Dr. Korndorffer contended that he was not required to keep records in the instances
charged.

The supreme court decided that the crux of the matter was that the physician was not charged
with violating art. 725 (b), and fraud or deceit upon the public are not elements of the statute.
The court concluded: "The charge against him was that he deceived or defrauded the public by
failing to keep records. We find no evidence that Dr. Korndorffer deceived or misled anyone."

Id. at 475.
' Coleman v. Railroad Comm'n, 445 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1969), error
granted.
4
STEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c (1970).
'The pertinent portion of TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c (1970) provides: "Upon
the filing of an application for pooling of interests into a unit under this Act, at least 30 days
notice shall be given to all interested parties . . . in the manner and form prescribed by the
Commission before hearing on such application .... "
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road Commission had never acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter
because the required notice had not been given, and that his request for a
jury trial on the jurisdictional issue should have been granted. The appellate tribunal concluded that Coleman was entitled to a jury trial on the
notice issue. The court reasoned that the trial court was under a duty to
exercise its independent judgment and determine from a preponderance of
the evidence ultimate fact issues relevant to jurisdiction. Also, the court
concluded that both the Commission and Ashford had failed to draw a
distinction between "jurisdictional facts" and "administrative facts" that
the Commission might be required to determine in the execution of its
administrative functions. In short, jurisdictional fact issues were judicial in
nature and the courts must determine them by a preponderance of the
evidence."0
The author does not recall a Texas case in which a similar result was
reached concerning jurisdictional facts. The Coleman case appears to emit
shades and phases of the old Crowell v. Benson" jurisdictional fact theory,
in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that de novo review of
an administrative fact determination was required where "jurisdictional
fact" issues were involved." Most leading authorities in the area of administrative law have asserted that the doctrine has been substantially rejected
by later Supreme Court holdings and that the vast majority of state courts
have also refused to adhere to the concept."
Rule Making: Validity. The Texas supreme court, in a 1970 decision,"
upheld the validity of the Texas Liquor Control Board's (now the Texas
"In Railroad Comm'n v. Coleman, 460 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1970), the supreme court affirmed
the court of appeals decision on an entirely different basis and specifically refused to determine
whether the litigant was entitled to a jury trial on the notice issue.
5i 2 85 U.S. 22 (1932).
"' The Supreme Court stated in Benson: "A different question is presented where the determinations of fact are fundamental or 'jurisdictional,' in the sense that their existence is a condition
precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme." Id. at 54-55. The Court noted that in
situations involving constitutional rights, the judicial power of the United States extended to
independent determinations of both factual and legal questions. The Court concluded that the
"essential independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the enforcement of constitutional rights requires that the Federal court should determine such an issue upon
its own record and the facts elicited before it." Id. at 64.
"a For an excellent discussion of the jurisdictional-fact doctrine, see 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.08 (1958). Professor Davis concludes that "Crowell v. Benson is one of
the celebrated cases in the development of administrative law, although its doctrine is probably
no longer the law." Id. at 156. See also 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIvE LAw 675-76 (1965).
In relation to the application of the jurisdictional-fact doctrine in state courts, Professor Cooper
observes:
The question whether the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson will be followed in the
state courts arises principally in workmen's compensation cases, where the question of
the existence of the employer-employee relationship (one of the precise issues described
as "jurisdictional facts" in Crowell v. Benson) can be viewed as a critical question
of fact on which depends the jurisdiction of the commission to make an award of
compensation.
A few state courts have followed Crowell v. Benson; but most state courts, not
conceiving themselves bound to follow it as a matter of due process, have declined
to apply the doctrine in reviewing administrative determinations as to the existence
of the employer-employee relationship in workmen's compensation and other like
cases, and have been content to affirm the administrative finding of fact if it is
supported by evidence.
Id. at 157.
4
Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. The Attic Club, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1970).
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Alcoholic Beverage Commission) rule 56,' governing the procedural operation for membership in private clubs licensed under the Texas Liquor
Control Act."5
The rule became effective on September 1, 1969, and, shortly thereafter,
two private clubs registered under the Texas Liquor Control Act brought
suit to restrain enforcement of the rule. The request for a temporary restraining order was denied by the trial court and the clubs appealed. Before the court of appeals, the appellants contended that the rule was void
in toto because the proper procedures' had not been followed in enacting
the rule and that sections 3 (3) and 4 were too vague and indefinite."
The court of appeals, in reversing the decision of the trial court, concluded that since findings of fact as required by article 666-7(a)"9 were
not contained in the promulgating order, or in other records of the Board,
the necessary findings of fact had not been made, and the rule was void
in toto. The court further found that section 3 (3) of the rule dealing
with the definition of a "guest" and section 4 concerning "regular food
service adequate for its members and guests, ' lent themselves to a wide
variety of inconsistent interpretations and thus were void for vagueness.
The supreme court, in reversing the court of appeals, first concluded
that article 666-7 (a) did not require an order of the Board adopting rules
in an exercise of its delegated powers to contain findings of fact; nor that
findings of fact be otherwise reduced to writing. The statute stated only
that the Board was empowered to act upon findings of fact. Hence,
special or written findings were not declared to be a prerequisite to the
validity of the order.
Concerning the definition of the terms "guest" and "regular food
5 RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD rule 56 (1969).
"aTEx.PEN. CODE ANN. arts. 666-1 to 667-31 (1952).
"' The specific procedural complaint related to the requirements of TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art.
666-7(a) (1952), which provides (emphasis added):
No rule or regulation for which a penalty is prescribed either by this Act or by the
Board, shall be adopted by the Board except after notice and hearing. Notice of such
hearing shall be given by publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation
in different sections of the State. Such notice shall specify the date and place of
hearing and the subject matter of the proposed rule or regulation and shall constitute sufficient notice to all parties. The date of hearing shall be not less than ten
(10) days from the date of publication of notice. At such hearing any person, either
by himself or by attorney, may present relevant facts either in support or opposition
thereto. The Board shall upon a finding of facts, have the authority and power to
adopt, modify, or alter such rules or regulations.
58 RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE TEXAS LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD rule 56 (1969) provides
in part:
Section 3. As provided in Article I, Section 15(e) of the Texas Liquor Control
Act, alcoholic beverages owned by members of a private club may be served only to
and consumed only by a member, a member's family, or their guests.
(3). The word 'guest' shall mean an individual who is personally known by the
member or one of the member's family and who is admitted to the club premises
by personal introduction of, or in the physical company of, the member or one of
the member's family.
Section 4. A Private Club shall provide regular food service adequate for its members and their guests. The term 'food service adequate for its members and their
guests' shall mean that complete meals shall be available on the club premises for
service to members, their families, and guests.
9
See note 57 sup6ra.
o See note 58 supra.
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service adequate for its members and guests," the court concluded that
' As
these were "words of general unde rstanding. 'es
far as the first term
was concerned, the test was a simple one of whether the guest was personally known to and vouched for by a host member. In relation to the
second term, the court was of the opinion that the implementation of the
statutory requirement that a private club "shall provide regular food service adequate for its members and their guests," in terms of "complete meals
available on the club premises, ' was sufficiently understandable to the
operators of private clubs.
The supreme court appears to be engaging in a realistic analysis of the
rule, while at the same time employing a presumption of validity. The
court specifically stated that the administrative rule is of equal parity
with a legislative enactment.' Such a declaration is encouraging, for in
reading prior rule-making decisions one could easily conclude that in the
past Texas courts have not treated agency rules with the dignity of legislative acts, but rather have felt relatively free to substitute their judgment
for that of the agencies on the advisability of agency rules. Judicial language to this effect, however, will not be found."

61457 S.W.2d at 45.
02See note 58 supra.
3 "A rule or order promulgated by an administrative agency acting within its delegated
author-

ity should be considered under the principles as if it were the act of the legislature." 457 S.W.2d
at 45.

"See, e.g., Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tex.
1967) (dissenting opinion); Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 388 S.W.2d 409
(Tex. 1965); Gerst v. Jefferson County Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 390 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1965), error ref. n.r.e.; Harrington v. State, 385 S.W,2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1964), rev'd, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966).

